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ABSTRACT 
RIMEN BRAR SINGH: The Effect of State Capacity on Civil Conflict in India 
(Under the direction of Matt DiGiuseppe) 
 
This thesis seeks to study the relationship between state capacity and civil conflict 
in India. This thesis provides insight on concepts such as state capacity, intrastate 
rebellious conflict, and greed and grievance, but the main focus of this thesis is on 
sub-national differences. The thesis attempts to demonstrate how sub-national differences 
may affect state capacity and influence intrastate conflict. Two aspects of sub-national 
differences are investigated: topography and roads. Specifically, data for topography and 
roads are confined within India. India is chosen to be a case study due to its diverseness 
in people and geography. The methods used to record this data involve carefully 
examining maps within each sub-national region and recording these examinations into 
SPSS to determine possible correlations to conflict. Three categories of recorded conflict 
are used as independent variables: state based violence, battle deaths, and terroristic 
deaths. These independent variables consist of measured activities in India from as early 
as the 1980s to as late as 2011. The findings from a regression analysis of this data 
suggest that topography and roads is correlated to conflict. The study concludes that 
increased topography correlates to an increase in terroristic deaths, and a lack of roads is 
related to increased battle deaths, state based violence, and terrorism deaths.  
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 Introduction:  
Why do rebels challenge the government, the authority that has a monopoly on 
coercion within the state? No matter what kind of government prevails in an area, one 
aspect remains constant among them: each government has some sort of state capacity. 
Hendrix states, “state capacity is a state’s ability to deter or repel challenges to its 
authority with force.” Yet, state capacity is not limited to these aspects as state capacity 
can also include political democracy and dominance over citizens (Hendrix 2010, 
274-275). In other words, state capacity is the measurement of how well a state can 
ensure stability within its territory through militarized and political means. To maintain 
stability, states require resources. Not all states possess the same types and level of 
resources; these major resources can include technology, capital, military, and 
governmental efficiency. A resource advantage could be instrumental for the containment 
and prevention of conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2001). High capacity states are considered as 
states that are able to supply significant public goods such as effective domestic and 
interstate security, health services, and freedom in the development of physical and social 
infrastructure. Therefore, high capacity states receive mass abidance from citizens under 
their domain as essential living requirements are provided while these benefits could be 
lost without the formation and proper structure of these states (Ottervik 2013). Plus in 
general, well structured policing lowers the potential of all forms of domestic violence 
(Mueller 2000). Low capacity states are seen as states which struggle to and are 
ineffective in providing these major and essential public goods. The consequences of the  
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 lack of state capacity include “low social trust, low development levels, regime, or even 
state failure.” Governments, especially democracies, are highly vulnerable to collapse if 
high state capacity is not maintained (Ottervik 2013, 3). Bugajski explains,  
State weakness can spawn the creation of armed criminal gangs and armed 
vigilante groups, provoke inter-ethnic conflicts, anti-immigrant pogroms, 
separatist movements, and significant refugee outflows. Such developments will 
also stimulate the growth of organized crime and smuggling operations 
transcending national borders (2011, 1). 
Thus, state capacity is an important concept. Because state capacity is based on 
the effectiveness of a state to withstand opposition from forces ranging from citizens to 
other states, state capacity is a huge determinant to whether a state exists at all. The 
ability to recognize whether a state is low capacity or high capacity could be invaluable 
when analyzing international events and relations. As already mentioned, low capacity 
states risk collapsing due to their weakness and lack of effectiveness in providing basic 
goods. (Ottervik 2013). Apart from the massive repercussions within a state, how grand 
of an impact on an international scale can occur with the collapse of a state? At the time 
of this thesis, the world is experiencing the effects of the breakdown of Iraq and Syria 
and the expansion of an insurgency known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Millions 
of people are being displaced, many are dying in the attempt to reach safety, and tensions 
are soaring in Europe over what actions to take about this insurgency and refugee crisis 
(Dearden 2016). The Middle Eastern turmoil is not what I will be explaining in my thesis, 
but it provides a strong example of why considering state capacities before turmoil occurs 
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 might be a good idea. In my thesis, I do not specifically analyze the effects of states 
losing control or what could be done to improve state capacity, but rather I take a step 
back. I seek to determine the correlation between state capacity and conflict from a 
sub-national setting.  
To make this determination, I examine the state of India. I find India a remarkable 
case to study due to its incredible diversity; the state composes of numerous religions, 
ethnic groups, as well as multitudes of languages. The geography of the state is 
interestingly diverse with India having regions which compose of deserts, forests, plains, 
tropics, islands, and mountains (Central Intelligence Agency 2016 B). In my observation, 
I look at the impact of state capacity both sub-nationally and across time. I do my 
research by viewing measurements both natural, such as in agriculture and geography, 
and man-made, including terrorism, violence, and roads.  
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 Literature Review: 
A critical concept to note when examining conflict is to understand what 
constitutes conflict. A conflict generally defines a heavy contention that may or may not 
result in violent clashes, so the term “conflict” itself is very broad. There are different 
areas of conflict such as interstate conflict, trans-state conflict, and intrastate conflict. 
Interstate conflict is conflict between two or more separate states. Interstate conflict can 
be based on territorial contesting, conduct with ethnic groups, and resources. Trans-state 
conflict is not limited within a specific place and involves “international terrorism, 
economic sabotage, and cyber-attacks that precipitate state paralysis, undermine national 
security, or provoke international conflicts with sponsoring states.” The area of conflict 
where this thesis will focus on in is intrastate conflict which involves “civil conflicts 
precipitated by deepening political cleavages, economic distress, and growing 
inequalities.” Intrastate conflict can result in “erosion of government legitimacy, a 
breakdown of law and order, and escalating ungovernability” (Bagajski 2011, 1). 
Conflict can also be broken into three different categories. A crises is when a 
group feels threatened and military conflict seems likely to occur. A dispute can actually 
involve force as it occurs when military force is used, but deaths as a result of the force 
used are supposed under 1000 to be classified as a dispute. War is the most extreme form 
of conflict as war involves over 1000 casualties while typically being fought over a 
prolonged period of time (Sambanis 2001). Thus, conflict is definitely a highly 
concerning matter for states. The principal of a state is to assert control over its claimed  
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 territory. In fact, Weber is the founder of the standard and widely accepted 
definition of a state; he defines a state as “the human community that successfully claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” and Weber 
rules that “if a state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the 
powers that be” (Ottervik 2013, 6). The formation of conflict itself is a challenge to the 
authority of a state. As mentioned previously, conflict infers violence or the likelihood 
that violence will occur, and groups tend to consist of goals which are against the 
interests of other parties. Thus, conflict hinders the domestic stability of a state and 
threatens the intentions of the leaders of a state. 
Before internal violent conflicts occur, states usually have to deal with protests or 
the displaying of intense demands from a certain group. States have massive influence 
over the outcomes of domestic protests as leaders may choose to appease the unsatisfied 
through concessions or deny protesters any concessions. High capacity states tend to 
accurately recognize the interests of protesters, contact the group's uneasy leaders, 
encourage and take part in negotiations, and provide enforceable agreements whereas low 
capacity states tend to have difficulty and often failures with these provisions. As protests 
are often against the policies and interests of leaders, the displays may discourage 
interaction in some instances as leaders could interpret protests as disrespectful. For a 
protest to be effective, it must rely on organization and disruption; organization assists in 
the management of demands while disruption results in state leaders gaining incentives to 
take care of the demands of protesters. Repression of protests is much more difficult for  
democratic states than authoritarian states as democratic states provide citizens the right 
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 to “complain, petition, organize, protest, demonstrate, and strike” whereas authoritarian 
states are not constricted by these obligations. Regardless of governmental structure, 
repression and failure to properly address demands results in groups gaining ill-feelings 
which could result in groups committing greater actions (Sullivan 2013, 16). 
One specific type of conflict is ethnic conflict. As the term suggests, ethnic 
conflict occurs when ethnicity has a direct correlation to the outbreak of conflict. Ethnic 
conflict implies dispute between different ethnic groups rather than a dispute among one 
ethnic group. An important concept to understand when analyzing ethnic conflict is to 
recognize what separates one ethnic group from another. Perhaps Max Weber best 
explains what constitutes ethnicity as he describes that ethnic groups can be contrasted 
through aspects such as “color, language, religion, tribes, races, nationalities, and casts” 
(Sambanis 2001, 261). The goals of ethnic groups usually are “about preserving regional 
autonomy, linguistic education rights, ethnic representation,” and religious freedom over 
economic possibilities (Sambanis 2001, 267). As Thomas Hobbs suggests, lack of trust 
may facilitate violence and even preemptive attacks (Kydd & Walter 2006). Other than 
autonomic and policy concerns, ethnic conflict may also be fueled by fear and lack of 
interaction. In fact, “high levels of civic engagement can lead to lower levels of ethnic 
violence,” so group avoidance is certainly a factor that contributes to ethnic conflict. If 
ethnic groups become frightened about their well-being and suspect that an outside group 
could threaten their livelihood, tensions may result which could lead to conflict. 
Circumstances which could trigger tension include contempt between cultures, intrusion 
on another ethnic group's territory, and concern that women within an ethnic group will 
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 be violated by another ethnic group if action is not taken (Brubaker & Laitin 1998, 435). 
Thus, ethnic conflict is an important concept to be acknowledged not only because ethnic 
conflict is a major form as conflict but also since ethnic conflict may threaten stability 
within a state. Additionally, ethnicity may put the interests of a magnitude of people at 
stake as ethnicity incorporates broad categories of people such as color, religion, and 
race. A reasonable assumption is that the more people involved within a conflict, the 
more violence, deaths, economic loss, and instability there will be. A state’s lack of 
ability or avoidance in addressing ethnic concerns and tensions may result in these groups 
engaging in violence due to the unresolved issues. Perhaps another reasonable 
assumption is that ongoing violence between ethnic groups will be prolonged if a state 
does not intervene. Regardless of the specific situation, the inability to properly address 
the formation of tension and prevent the emergence of conflict between massively broad 
factions of a population definitely demonstrates the limited capacity of a state.  
However, conflict is definitely not limited to ethnicity. Conflict may also involve 
the emergence of insurgencies. The emergence of insurgencies can result from 
insufficient governmental control in areas such as political, territorial, and militarial. 
Other factors may include “rough terrain, large population, access to weapons, or foreign 
support for the insurgency” (Fearon and Laitin 2001, 3). Authoritarian governments tend 
to have greater advantages in dealing with unruly behavior, whether the behavior be  
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 ethnic or not, compared to democracies. With minimum tendencies towards the concern 
of human rights, discontented conflict within a state tends to consist of elites promoting 
shady groups to help take down ethnic rioters. In response, average citizens may turn 
supportive or intimidated into allowing inhumane tragedies, such as genocide, take place 
or may provide direct assistance in the violent activities (Fearon and Laitin 2001). 
Rebel groups are typically much less resourceful than established governments so, 
thus, are unable to efficiently fight a direct war. Rebellious groups may result to the use 
of terrorism as a mean to achieve their political goals, and there are multiple strategies 
through the use of terrorism. One tactic is attrition which involves terrorists proving and 
threatening to inflict considerable costs if their demand is not met. Another strategy is 
intimidation in which terrorists retaliate against public disobedience; when the 
government is not capable to prevent terrorist enforcement, the public follows the rules of 
the terrorists. Provocation consists of triggering an extreme reaction from a government 
which leads more people objecting to government and joining the terrorists' cause. 
Spoiling is when terrorists disrupt possibilities of a peace agreement by discrediting a 
party involved in the negotiation. Outbidding occurs when terrorists attempt to gain the 
support of the public by displaying tremendous firmness in fighting the enemy (Kydd & 
Walter 2006). The use of terrorism commonly implies that participants seek “regime 
change, territorial change, policy change, social control, or status quo maintenance” 
(Kydd & Walter 2006, 52). Giving into the demands of terrorists may seem as a possible 
but humiliating settlement for peace, however “governments that have already yielded to 
terrorist demands are more likely to experience additional terrorist attacks” (Kydd & 
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 Walter 2006, 63). The importance behind terrorism and state capacity is that terroristic 
measures may contribute to a diminishment of state capacity. The numerous ways 
terrorism can be applied demonstrates that terrorism contains multiple possibilities that 
may alter a state’s ability to maintain stability. This alteration could infer a disruption of 
social, political, or military harmony and possibly, governmental efficiency. Of course, 
governmental efficiency is needed for the distribution of public goods such as health 
services, infrastructure development and maintenance, and security. Thus, successful 
terrorism could have disastrous effects on a state and its functions. The inability for a 
state to fulfill its functions may lead to disarray (Kydd & Walter 2006).  
According to the empirical findings of Hendrix and Young, the relationship 
between terrorism and state capacity differentiates depending on the state capacity and 
the state’s focus. Hendrix and Young divide the concept behind a state’s focus into two 
categories: administrative and military. States that possess a strong administrative or 
bureaucratic capacity are less likely to experience terroristic attacks compared to states 
which struggle with their administrative capacity. Hendrix and Young suggest that well 
administered states have significant policing and capabilities to confront social 
grievances which become deterrents for terrorism. States “with more conventional 
military capacity” are less likely to face terroristic attacks than states with non 
conventional military capacity (Cullen & Young 2014, 347). Hendrix and Young suggest 
the reasoning behind this is that significantly sized and funded militaries could contribute 
towards grievance as military spending is positively correlated with political corruption, 
and military spending may be perceived as a form of patronage politics that “saps societal 
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 resources from other uses” (Cullen & Young 2014, 351). A history of terroristic activity 
may also increase the possibility of terrorist attacks as Hendrix and Young state “more 
developed countries with larger populations that previously experienced attacks and are 
embroiled in civil conict experience more terrorist attacks” (Cullen & Young 2014, 
347).  
The buildup and continuous existence of rebel groups can be attributed as a result 
of several different explanations. A possible reason for rebellion is greed. The greed 
explanation suggests that rebellious individuals and factions may act out of yearning for 
materialistic or economic gain. Conflict may provide the opportunity for groups to obtain 
valuable materials such as gold, oil, and diamonds. Other than the raw wealth these 
products can provide, these goods could turn into a precious resource for leaders as the 
materials may be used to fund a militaristic campaign or political cause. The availability 
of and capability to distribute these financial resources correlates to the speed of 
gathering soldiers and supplies. Another explanation to the formation and preserving of 
rebel groups is insufficient state handling of inequalities. Inequality refers to the 
difference between groups in categories such as property, wages, and political rights. In 
other words, inequality does not pertain to matters or expectations within a group, but it 
is a comparison of resources between contrasting groups. Inequalities are a concern since 
major differences between groups may cause resentment or grievances from a 
disadvantaged group as the group could believe that they have been wronged in being 
able to obtain similar advantages as the upper groups. The disadvantaged group would 
also have lower socioeconomic status compared to the upper groups and may gain the 
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 perception of being politically repressed and undesired due to the disadvantaged group's 
ethnicity  which only adds to the bitterness of the situation (Regan & Norton 2005). 
Though greed and grievances may play a part in intrastate conflict, the 
significance of greed and grievances on their own may not be so great. Since actors can 
be motivated to participate and profit from conflict according to the greed theory, the 
identities of these actors as rebellious groups or insurgents seems inaccurate. As indicated 
previously, an insurgency or rebellion defines an instance where a group attempts to 
overthrow an established government in order to facilitate change, so those who seek to 
financially profit from conflict are in a different category. Actors who have the primary 
goal of increasing wealth and engage in violent behavior for this purpose would be better 
classified as “bandits or pirates” (Collier & Hoeffler 2002, 5). The grievance explanation 
may lack significance based on the concept of universal grievance. Universal grievance 
proposes that “all countries might have groups with a sufficiently strong sense of 
grievance to wish to launch a rebellion.” Therefore, “rebellions will occur where they are 
viable” (Collier & Hoeffler 2002, 6). As stated previously, rebellions are likely to occur 
where governments are weak, and contributing factors include governmental military, 
politics, and geographical landscape. Thus for greed and grievance to be significant 
factors, they need to be intertwined. For an insurgency to develop, grievances must exist, 
and those grievances must be directed towards the goal of overthrowing a regime. In 
order for a rebellion to last, the rebellious group must have the capacity to sustain itself 
against opposing governmental forces, and sustaining requires supplying troops and 
gathering equipment which is possible to do through the greed explanation (Collier & 
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 Hoeffler 2002). 
However, Murshed and Tadjoeddin offer a different analysis. They consider greed 
to be about opportunity, specifically economic opportunity. Economic opportunity can be 
obtained through three categories: financing, recruitment, and geography. Financing is 
done by rebellious groups through controlling natural resources, receiving donations by 
sympathizers who do not necessarily reside in the group’s state, grants sent by outside 
regimes who unfavorably view the contested state, and even multinational businesses 
which have their own interests in the area. Among all the finance opportunities, Murshed 
and Tadjoeddin believe that natural resources are the most crucial. Recruitment is defined 
as “the opportunity to induct fighting manpower.” Manpower is a necessary component 
for a group to have the ability to exert tactical force; without force, rebellious groups lack 
threatening power. Therefore, any of the methods through financing could be negatively 
altered against rebellious groups if sufficient manpower is not maintained; these groups 
could lose control of natural resources or lose support from outside regimes and 
businesses. An ideal setting for recruitment is in an area which contains heavy numbers 
of young jobless males who are constrained by poverty and lack of education. Geography 
is another important category for rebellious groups to sustain economic opportunity. 
Direct conflict with state forces is typically not ideal for rebellious groups, so areas which 
contain mountains or other types of rough terrain are advantageous for these groups. The 
correlation between manpower and geography, which the definitions of the term 
themselves do not involve currency, to economic opportunity is that they provide a 
needed situation for rebellious groups: the ability to fight or contest against a state. 
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 Through fighting and achievements from fighting, economic benefits can be gained. 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin mention the empirical findings of Collier and Hoeffler which 
claims “rebel opportunity or greed akin to loot-seeking are the main reasons for civil 
war.” Murshed and Tadjoeddin also acknowledge that greed can be seen as a “criminal 
motivation for civil war.” However, grievance is an entirely different motivational 
concept than greed. In grievance, groups are not influenced by possible economic 
benefits. Rather, grievance is centered towards the need for perceived justice in areas 
such as “ethnic religious divisions, political repression, and horizontal inequality” 
(Murshed & Tadjoeddin 2007, 5). 
In the scenario where a group rebels, the group may face a collective action 
problem. Collective action occurs when people work together in order to accomplish a 
goal. While the concept would seem to be efficient, the problem with collective action is 
that when large groups of people work together, the process opens the possibility for free 
riding. Free riding is when an actor that is part of a group does not contribute towards the 
group's goal. Since other actors have interest and are working towards the goal, a 
non-contributing actor can refrain from providing effort or resources as the actor assumes 
other actors will achieve the goal anyway. Thus, free riding reduces efficiency and even 
encourages actors to not work together despite having a common goal. Though collective 
action generally opens the possibility of free riding, collective action can be structured to 
make free riding less likely. As Rajiv Sethi states, “collective action problems are not 
insurmountable....communication and coordination are critical in overcoming them.” 
Continuous interaction and planning among actors within a group facilitates response to 
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 behavior which encourages activity, cooperation, and fulfillment of responsibilities 
(2008, 3). 
Low state capacity can potentially influence the formation of conflict. As 
mentioned previously, state capacity defines how well states can effectively respond to 
challenges, and these challenges include threats to stability. On the sub-national level, 
low capacity states may struggle with different types of essential services such as the 
provision of health. The provision of health includes the need for proper healthcare 
facilities, professionals, and available methods to combat public health concerns such as 
child mortality. Though medical concerns is different from conflict, the lack of medical 
services may still play an influence towards conflict as a grievance; plus, a population 
struggling to combat preventable diseases would not seem very stable. Another area 
where low capacity states can struggle is with security and bureaucracy. At the 
sub-national level, security may involve stability and peace from rebellions and intense 
crime at the local level; “the local level” is emphasized as state capacity may also include 
a state’s ability to challenge interstate threats, but for the purpose of this thesis, only 
sub-national threats and influences to state capacity will be addressed. Though peace 
agreements can be thought to occur at the interstate level, peace agreements are also 
necessary aspects of the subnational level. A sufficient bureaucracy is needed for societal 
agreements such as “power-sharing, constitutional reform, democratization, [and] 
decentralization of authority” (DeRouen Jr. & Sobek 2014, 1). An important area where 
low capacity states may struggle at the sub-national level is the public sector. This 
category includes “training public servants, control of corruption, maintaining and 
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 accounting for state assets, and tax revenue collection” (DeRouen Jr. & Sobek 2014, 1). 
If a state is unable to efficiently perform these actions, the state’s authority could be weak 
enough to be contested by armed insurgents (DeRouen Jr. & Sobek 2014).  
A significantly agreed upon notion among political science researchers is the 
resource curse. The resource curse is a concept which explains that the states with high 
amounts of resources “will experience negative economic, political and social outcomes 
including poor economic performance, low levels of democracy, and civil war” 
(McNeish 2010, 3). These resources include minerals, hydrocarbons, water, and land. 
The reasoning behind the correlation between states having an amplitude of resources and 
terrible effects is that these states tend to fail in using these resources to enhance their 
might. The wealth gained from the luxurious amounts of resources is not used to 
economically strengthen the masses of citizens belonging to the state but rather benefits 
the limited numbers of individuals who control these resources. The resource curse is a 
theory which offered a different explanation for intrastate institutional and economic 
failures rather than previous notions of past imperialism, dependence, and foreign state 
meddling being the chief cause. This theory is based on resource abundance which is the 
“high production per capita” of a resource. Resource abundance should not be confused 
with resource dependency which describes a situation “where resources constitute a high 
proportion of the country‘s exports” (McNeish 2010, 5). 
McNeish mentions, “natural resource abundance leads to various types of 
emotional or irrational behaviour on the part of political elites, in turn contributing to 
poor economic policy-making and institutional deterioration” (McNeish 2010, 6). 
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 Specifically, these political elites may develop lack of intellectual insight, become 
sluggish in attempting to make accomplishments, and indulge in an extravagant lifestyle. 
All of these politically irrational attributes are not adequate for the proper maintenance of 
a state since the characteristics harm state efficiency and the formation of effective 
policies. However, rational actors may also be influenced by a resource abundance. 
McNeish offers the ideas of Ross; Ross argues for a notion he calls “rent-seeking.” 
Rent-seeking is an action in which “rational political elites will take the opportunity to 
either directly seize the rents created by resource booms or gain control over the right to 
allocate them” (McNeish 2010, 6).Therefore, a resource abundance may lead to wealth 
being distributed politically rather than privately towards “ investment, production and 
economic growth.” Due to this market, states may cater to the financial interests of 
businesses over the interests of poor or common people (McNeish 2010, 7). 
The correlation between the resource curse and intrastate conflict could be 
significant. The reason the resource curse could play between state capacity and conflict 
is that the resource curse negatively affects state institutions. As explained, an abundance 
of resources may provide wealth, but this wealth can be distributed among political elites. 
Rather than being used to improve state institutions, the wealth is misspent among those 
in control, and these people become more focused with the obtained capital over the 
masses of citizens and implement policies that favor their own economic interests at the 
expense of the citizenry. Based on this knowledge, an assumable effect could be that state 
capacity is weakened in areas that do not contain valuable resources since political elites 
are focused on maintaining control of their obtained resources. Plus, greed and grievance 
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 may become conflict factors off of the resource curse. Since wealth is being unfairly 
distributed at the expense of the entire state’s benefit, the commoners would be 
reasonable in developing grievances against the state’s current regime. With the 
availability of mass resources, greed may influence groups who see an opportunity to 
take control of the resources themselves and make profits.  
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 Theory:  
I theorize that subnational differences have an impact to state capacity. The 
prevalence and prosperity of regimes in the supplying of goods and prevention of 
rebellious takeovers may indicate sufficient control over masses of citizens, but there is a 
characteristic that all states have which could be difficult in administering: geography. 
The terrain over an entire state can be incredibly diverse. For example, the United States 
is filled with variations of geographic regions which include plainlands, flatlands, forests, 
beaches, hills, swamps, deserts, and mountains (Central Intelligence Agency 2016 A). 
Settlements onto and maintenance in these different areas require different methods 
which means the diverseness of geography prevents states from enacting a uniform 
approach to address issues such as bad weather, natural disasters, and even basic services 
such as security. Law enforcement patrols or locating a dangerous fugitive would be 
much trickier in a mountainous or forest area compared to searching through flat easily 
visible land. Though people are known to live in rough terrain, rough terrain seems to not 
be the most ideal for development and governmental investment. By common 
knowledge, stable buildings need to be built on solid flat land; otherwise, the building 
would find difficulty in being stable since the structure would either lean due to an 
uneven surface or sink since the material underneath does not have the properties to 
support the structure. Perhaps this inefficiency for structure development partly explains 
why “numbers of people [decrease] faster than exponentially with increasing elevation” 
(Cohen & Small 1998, 14009). In fact, Joel E. Cohen and Christopher Small find that  
“global human population is heavily localized at low elevations” (Cohen & Small 1998, 
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 14010). Thus, states composing of numerous and different sub-national regions will 
likely have differences in population based on the altitudes of the terrains.  
The variance of population among contrasting sub-national areas reasonably 
could result in a state focusing more services towards areas with higher population 
densities; these are the areas likely to have a stable ground surface for building 
development which lead to economic incentives for a state to properly maintain the area. 
Plus with higher amounts of people at these lower altitudes, lower altitude regions likely 
contain the bulk of the common population. In order for the regime of a state to remain in 
control, the state needs to either appease or constrain its population (Fearon and Laitin 
2001). With more state resources and focus on lower and possibly flatter sub-national 
regions, an excellent question would be if higher and more uneven terrains experience 
instability. 
Hypothesis 1: Topography has a relationship to the emergence of conflict. I 
predict that the greater area of topography a region has, the more conflict it will 
experience. 
Null Hypothesis 1: Topography does not have a relationship to the emergence of 
conflict.  
Topography itself is an intensive landscape. Mountains are tall structures 
composed of extremely hardened minerals. In essence, mountains classify the terrain of 
an area as rough and not apparently ideal to for states to settle in or occupy. Because 
topography is incredibly rough, the ability to maneuver through this type of terrain can be 
difficult. Mountains cannot simply be cleared away such as forests or drained such as 
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 swamps, so their continued existence is much less guaranteed. Unless rugged territory 
seems to contain a valuable resource available for extract, such as gold or silver, the area 
would appear to have limited economic value for a state. In this instance where there are 
no useful natural resources, governments would be hesitant to invest in these places when 
capital could be best spent elsewhere such as in areas which could actually benefit the 
state economically and/or militarily.  
However, I think that jagged areas could also be a strain on a state’s capacity. If a 
state has established sovereignty over an area, the state will seemingly have to take 
measures to keep the area secured. As mentioned in the literature review, all states 
contain factions of individuals who would like to rebel, but these notions of rebellions are 
restricted by incentives and deterrents which make attempted rebellion perceptively not 
worthwhile (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). With the inclusion of raggedy areas within a 
state’s territory, these areas may counter the deterrent of a state’s military force. By 
seeking refuge in these areas, rebellious groups could possibly sustain their movement 
more ideally compared to being exposed in open terrain that can be easily accessed by an 
established state that will most likely always have superior resources and forces than an 
insurgency. Again, avoiding direct battle with governmental military forces is beneficial 
for rebellious groups as these groups tend to easily lose head on conflict (Murshed & 
Tadjoeddin 2007). Therefore, since the best tactical interest of rebellious groups is to 
avoid direct conflict with state forces, topography provides a seemingly ideal way to do 
so.  
Hypothesis 2: Roads have a relationship to the emergence of conflict. I predict 
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 that the less developed infrastructure a region has, the more conflict it will experience. 
Null Hypothesis 2: Roads do not have a relationship to the emergence of conflict. 
Rough terrain may provide a place for rebellious groups to organize and gradually 
gain strength as these groups could be away from governmental surveillance. I think that 
rough terrain not only contains extra natural features compared to flatlands but that rough 
terrain contains fewer ways to navigate the area compared to highly populated areas such 
as cities. My reasoning behind this is that the limited population and economic potential 
would diminish the incentive for building manmade structures, specifically quality roads, 
for easier access. I realize that an argument against my reasoning could be how rebellious 
groups residing in an area with low numbers and terrible wealth would not be a credible 
threat against a state’s capacity considering the group’s seemingly lack of capacity in 
maintaining itself much less supporting forces which could challenge an existing state. 
However, my response to this argument is simple: terrorism. Yes, a rebellious faction can 
challenge state authority and diminish a state’s capacity while the group itself has low 
authority and limited resources in itself. As mentioned in the literature review, terrorists 
can engage in several tactics which may push states to giving into the demands of a 
significantly weaker opponent. These tactics include spoiling agreements between states 
and parties, provoking states into engaging in actions which causes the state to lose 
popularity and possibly gain enemies, and any success in terrorist activities could result 
in outbidding in which terrorists gain public control by proving their dominance over the 
state (Kydd & Walter 2006). 
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 Research Design: 
In this section I will explain the testing of my two hypotheses. I will explain what 
variables are used, where they came from, and how they were collected. 
Regarding the testing of natural and regional factors towards the influence on 
conflict, I came across a very interesting publication. Gerdis Wischnath and Halvard 
Buhaug consider and test numerous factors which influence conflict. These factors 
include climate, agriculture, water shortages, the resource mobilization theory, individual 
opportunity costs, collective opportunities for mobilization, and grievances. In their 
analysis, Wischnath and Buhaug use empirical data which ranges from the 1980s to 2011 
and encompasses measurements from all Indian states and territories. They find India “a 
near ideal case” to analyze due to the state having “the highest number of ongoing 
intrastate conflicts over the last decades” in which the “conflicts involve mostly rural 
populations living off the land, [and] worsening conditions under climate change have 
been promoted as a source of escalating violence.” Also exemplary is that India produces 
the second largest quantity of food in the world, and “agriculture constitutes the largest 
economic sector in most Indian states” (Wischnath & Buhaug 2014, 9). The experiment 
is set up with three dependent variables: severity of state base political violence, deadly 
incidents in states that are scenes of chronic conflict, and number of battle deaths in 
armed intrastate conflicts. Wischnath and Buhaug state “the main independent variable 
for this study is an indicator of food production growth” which is based from “annual 
data on wheat and rice production obtained from the Indian Ministry of 
Agriculture”(Wischnath & Buhaug 2014, 11). 
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 The results from their experiment supports the notion “that food production 
growth lowers the intensity of organized violence” while “a loss of harvest is 
significantly associated with an increase in severity of fighting during the subsequent 
year” (Wischnath & Buhaug 2014, 13). Interestingly, the bad neighborhood effect, where 
civil conflict in adjacent areas causes a specific area to also experience increased conflict, 
is not applicable for India. As expectable, increased conflict severity results in increased 
fatalities and battle deaths (Wischnath & Buhaug 2014).  
Inspired by this fascinating publication which managed to link agriculture to 
conflict, I decided to conduct my own experiment to test whether additional variables 
may also have an impact on conflict within India. The experiment which I conducted was 
designed to add on to the findings of Wischnath and Buhaug, but before I explain the 
process of my experiment, the critical variables used in both Wischnath’s and Buhaug’s 
and my experiment should be explained first. 
An important variable used was mean neighborhood. Mean neighborhood is a 
representation of violent conflict in neighboring areas; this variable is important to factor 
in due to the bad neighbor effect in which conflict among neighboring areas may 
influence conflict to occur within an area. For the dependent variables, battle deaths is 
based on battle deaths from Indian states with over 5 years of conflicts during a period 
from 1990-2011. State base is based on food production and violent conflict from Indian 
states with over 5 years of conflicts during a period from 1982-2004. The dependent 
variable of terrorism is based on deaths from terrorism from 1993-2011 (Wischnath & 
Buhaug 2014). 
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 Another important variable used was food growth or in other words, agricultural 
yield. Agricultural yield is a critical variable to measure and include as food is a strong 
living necessity of every person. Without adequate amounts food to consume, the 
existence of an individual is threatened, and when the life of a person is threatened, he or 
she is definitely expected to take measures in order to counter the threat. Agricultural 
yield’s importance is not solely limited to consumption. Many people, especially in India 
as mentioned by Wischnath and Buhaug, are reliant on agriculture for their economic 
welfare. The loss or lack of wealth may contribute towards grievance, and those affected 
by diminished agricultural growth may become unruly as a result if the state does not 
provide sufficient assistance or suppression. As mentioned previously, data for food 
growth was received from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture. The data for this variable 
measured wheat and rice production in India from 1980-2011. The specific major 
agricultural product of each individual Indian state was recognized, and individual Indian 
states that lacked decent rice or wheat output were not included as “these observations 
would be unable to shed light on how variations in food production affect conflict 
dynamics.” Here is the formula for food growth: Food growth = (Agricultural production 
t1​ - Agricultural production ​t-1​)/Agricultural production ​t-1​ (Wischnath & Buhaug 2014). 
As mentioned by my hypotheses, two additional variables which I needed to test 
were topography and roads. These variables were not measured in the experiment of 
Wischanth and Buhaug.  As the experiment of Wischnath and Buhaug examined each 
individual Indian state, territory, and even several Indian cities, I also scanned through 
the Indian states, territories and cities in order to collect empirical data. (Wischnath & 
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 Buhaug 2014). 
The research of Wischath and Bahaug was based on numerous areas claimed and 
controlled by the state of India. Not only were all individual Indian states such as 
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh measured, but data for agriculture and violence was also 
received from offshore territories such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to find a source which provided a measurement to exactly 
how much topography covered each individual Indian state or area. Therefore, I needed 
to conduct my own method and determination. To construct a variable of topography, I 
used a resource that was available: maps. In order to obtain and analyze maps which 
depicted topography, I resorted to using online sources. In some cases where 
geographical maps were not available, I found maps which depicted altitude. I converted 
certain altitudes to topography based on the fact that mountains are defined as natural 
elevations which are generally higher than 2000 feet or 610 meters (Mountain 2016). By 
visually observing these maps, I estimated the percentage of topography covering the 
state. I understood that visual observation is perceptive which means the results of visual 
examinations differ from person to person. I understood that if I classified the coverage 
of topography over an area as 5%, someone else may perceive the coverage as 8% or 
maybe 10%. Therefore, I needed to make my classifications as accurate as possible. In 
order to make my topographic perception as accurate as possible, I edited all the maps I 
obtained by moving the mountainous regions, if there were any, into a corner of the state 
or territory. Once all the topography had been moved, I estimated how many times it 
would take for that corner to expand to cover the entire state or territory. For example, if 
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 the corner of topography would need to expand by 5 times in order to cover the whole 
state, this would suggest that 1/5 of the state or territory comprises of mountainous 
regions. Since I could obtain a fraction, I could easily convert the fraction into a 
percentage; 1/5 would convert to 20%, and 20% would be represented as .20 in my data. 
However, this process only included states and territories as mountains are not parts of 
Indian cities. In instances where topography for the cities would need to be filled in my 
data chart, I entered a value of 0.00. Below are samples of the maps I edited in order to 
the determine topographic coverage of areas: 
Andhra Pradesh map accessed from Mapsof.net. 
<​http://mapsof.net/gujarat/physical-map-of-andhra-pradesh​> 
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Karnataka map accessed from online published study of Dr. T.V. Ramachandra. 
<​http://wgbis.ces.iisc.ernet.in/energy/paper/ijrer_wind_energy/materials.htm​> 
 
 
Maharashtra map accessed from mapsofindia.com. 
<​http://marathi.mapsofindia.com/geography-history/topography-map.html​> 
I hypothesized roads to be an important contributor to intrastate conflict as well. 
In order to maintain dominance, states need to have sufficient quality access over their 
claimed territory. Without adequate access, maintaining enforceable order would be 
difficult and rebellious groups could be motivated to rebel through perceived opportunity. 
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 Plus roads require capital to build and maintain, so I assumed areas with difficulties 
funding roads would see fewer roads. Thus like topography, the lack of roads increases 
the roughness and inaccessibility of terrain.Yet again, existing produced measurements 
for quality and percentage of road coverage among Indian states and territories were 
unavailable. I resorted to maps in order to produce numerical variables for roads. I found 
road maps of each state, territory, and listed city. In my observation, I took a look at the 
size of the area and how well did significant roads, such as highways and major 
roadways, manage to cover the area. Road coverage was based on a 1-10 scale with 1 
describing barely any access to the area and 10 labeling absolute coverage of the entire 
area. For this reason, cities tended to get a 9 or 10 rating as cities are generally more 
compact and depend on and have greater access compared to wider areas. Plus, the cities 
included in the data included well populated and highly developed centers such as 
Bombay and New Dehli; in other words, these were major cities not just average cities 
with minimum developed infrastructure. 
 
Punjab map accessed from the ​Department of Panchayati Raj​. 
<​http://www.pbrdp.gov.in/documents/6205745/10894169/Road%20Map%20of%20Punjab.jpg?t=1420631
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 999440​> 
 
 
Jammu & Kasmir map accessed from mapsofindia.com 
<​http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/jammuandkashmir/jammuandkashmirroads.htm​> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 Empirical Findings: 
After I assembled and recorded numerical values for topography and roads, I 
merged my data along with Wischnath’s and Buhaug’s research data. Once the data was 
merged, I used SPSS to create a linear regression chart with the same three dependent 
variables as Wischnath and Buhaug, but also included my two independent variables of 
topography and roads along with other independent variables in the previous chart. The 
full results of the regression are observable through the data below: 
37 Observed Indian States, Cities, and Territories: 
1) Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
2) Andhra Pradesh  
3) Arunachal Pradesh 
4) Assam 
5) Bihar 
6) Bombay 
7) Chandigarh 
8) Chhattisgarh 
9) Dadra and Nagar Haveli 
10) Daman & Diu 
11) Delhi 
12) Goa 
13) Goa, Daman & Diu 
14) Gujarat 
15) Haryana 
16) Himachal Pradesh 
17) Jammu & Kashmir 
18) Jharkhand 
19) Karnataka 
20) Kerala 
21) Lakshadweep 
22) Madhya Pradesh 
23) Maharashtra 
24) Manipur 
25) Meghalaya 
26) Mizoram 
27) Nagaland 
28) Orissa 
29) Puducherry 
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 30) Punjab 
31) Rajasthan 
32) Sikkim 
33) Tamil Nadu 
34) Tripura 
35) Uttar Pradesh 
36) Uttarakhand 
37) West Bengal 
 
Results of Regression With Added Topography and Roads 
 
 Battle Deaths 
1990-2011 
State Base 
1982-2004 
Terrorism Deaths 
1993-2011 
(Constant) .339 (.316) 1.063 (.430) 1.941 (.425) 
food growth .052 (.154) -.380 (.252) -.061 (.243) 
time .002 (.007) .000 (.009) -.023 (.008) 
Topography  -.094 (.156) -.190 (.262) .239 (.231) 
Roads -.043 (.020) -.040 (.032) -.042 (.033) 
log mean neighbor bdbest -.020 (.020)   
bdbest log & lag    .895 (.019)   
log mean neighbor 
statebase 
 
-.107 (.039)  
statebaselag log & lag  .431 (.036)  
log mean neighbor 
terrorism 
 
 -.039 (.024) 
terrorlag log & lag   .864 (.029) 
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 Observations 232 414 191 
 
For topography, the standard of error is too high for battle deaths and state base to 
determine a correlation between these two variables. The large standard of error leaves 
the possibility that topography could heavily be related towards battle deaths and state 
based violence or not at all. To be honest, I am puzzled to why my standard of error is so 
high when comparing topography to battle deaths and state violence. Since the standard 
of error is so high, I precisely cannot tell whether topography leans towards a positive or 
negative correlation to conflict even after going through the precautionary steps of 
viewing numerous maps, editing those maps, and manually measuring percentages. 
Based off my research done before the experiment, my guess would be that topography is 
possibly a non-directional variable that has dependence on the specific circumstances and 
other variables when the matter is related to state based political violence and battle 
deaths. Perhaps population density within topographic areas might influence positive or 
negative correlations to state violence or battle deaths, or maybe even the intensity of 
greed or grievances within these populations could be cofactors. The greed may be over 
resources, such as valuable minerals, that could exist within topographic areas and 
grievance may exist based on unfair uses and distribution of these resources. High 
populations, greed, and grievance over an abundance of resources might contribute for an 
increase in state base and battle deaths, but perhaps lack of resources may contribute 
towards a negative correlation. The reason I suggest a negative correlation with a lack of 
resources is because greed can be assumed to be diminished in this scenario since 
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 significant wealth would not be able to be claimed from resources. An argument could be 
made about opportunities for groups to attempt seizures of different types of wealth 
unrelated to natural resources, but as suggested in my theory, unnaturally based wealth, 
such as businesses and consumer goods, is unlikely in topographic regions due to lower 
numbers of people residing in higher altitudes compared to lower altitudes and unstable 
surfaces for the construction of buildings, vital parts of economically significant cities. 
 However, my findings confirmed that increased topography is linked to an 
increase in deaths from terrorism. Thus, the results from the regression table support my 
theory that topographic regions seem like attractive and beneficial places for rebellious 
groups to take refuge and administer. What I find interesting about deaths from terrorism 
increasing with the topography is that, as stated before, the ratio of people living in lower 
and high altitudes is uneven. As altitude increases, the number of residents decrease. 
(Cohen & Small 1998). Prior to recognizing these results, a reasonable assumption would 
be that more deaths would be accumulated at lower altitudes since the population density 
is greater, and therefore, more people can seemingly be fatally harmed compared to 
people in topographic regions. Though greater amounts of deaths might be a potential in 
higher density areas rather than lower density, terroristic activities in India do not take 
advantage of this based on the results. If more terroristic deaths did not occur in 
topographic regions, the findings would have displayed a negative correlation between 
terroristic deaths and topography rather than positive. An explanation for the differences 
in amounts of deaths could be that greater numbers of fatal terrorist attacks occur in 
topographic regions. Even in the case where a significant number of people are killed by 
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 a terrorist attack in cities during certain incidents, numerous incidents could occur in 
topographic regions causing the number of fatalities in topographic regions to outnumber 
those in the cities. 
Meanwhile, where road access is limited, there is an increase in battle deaths, 
state violence, and deaths due to terrorism. As mentioned in the research design, cities 
were usually given the highest ratings; specifically, either a 9 or a 10. Therefore, road 
coverage seems to be abundant in economically developed and leveled areas which 
supports my previous suggestion that terroristic deaths occur less in cities or high density 
areas and are more likely to appear in barren areas. My suggestion for the correlation 
between the lack of roads and increase in battle deaths is based on the notion that 
rebellious groups need to shelter themselves in rough regions in order to avoid state 
detection and direct conflict; existing states tend to be more economically and militarily 
powerful than rebel groups, so full-out battle between the two forces is mostly not 
preferred for rebellious groups. Since these groups will tend to not be in highly populated 
and flat and easily visible areas, they will seek refuge in rougher terrain. My speculation 
is that the rougher the terrain, the less road coverage there will tend to be possibly 
because of lack of economic potential and higher difficulty in constructing and 
maintaining roads compared to flatter and lower altitude areas. For example, here is a 
topographic and road map of the Indian state Kashmir
34 
  
Kashmir map accessed from the library website of the University of Texas 
<​https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_region.jpg​> 
 
As noticeable by the map, Kashmir is heavily topographic. Also notice that map 
key indicates, the small lines on the bottom left side of Kashmir are roads; these roads 
constitute only a tiny part of the entire sub-national area. If rebellious groups are located 
in areas with fewer road coverage, certainly more battle deaths will be in these areas 
reasonably because these groups will be avoiding flatter and more developed areas. 
Therefore, the location of these battles will tend to take place in areas with limited road 
coverage. With more conflict in these limited road coveraged areas, of course state based 
violence will increase. The state would surely need to regain control of areas held by 
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 rebellious groups, but I think the reason state based violence has a correlation to limited 
road coverage is because lesser road coverage is correlated to terroristic and battle deaths. 
State based violence is possibly a response or an attempt to limited terroristic and battle 
deaths. 
Now I will compare my findings with the empirical results of Wischnath and 
Buhaug. Though Wischnath and Buhaug use different terms for the three dependent 
variables, our independent variables and number of observations for them are the same. 
Below is a chart of Wischnath’s and Buhaug’s findings. To be clear, ISPS stands for 
India Sub-National Problem Set and represents state based violence. SATP stands for 
South Asia Terrorism Portal and represents terroristic deaths. UCDP stands for Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program and represents battle deaths from intrastate conflicts (Wischnath 
and Buhaug 12). As noticeable from my results chart, I chose to simplify the terms. 
Empirical Results of Wischnath and Buhaug 
 
Resembling Wischnath’s and Buhaug’s findings, my results suggest that 
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 diminished food growth has a correlation to state based violence and deaths from 
terrorism. Wischnath and Buhaug reason that violence based on the lack of food growth 
is due to economic factors. They state that “agriculture is the largest economic sector in 
most Indian states” and that agriculture “employs the largest share of the total workforce” 
(Wischnath and Buhaug 2014, 13). Based on these facts, I agree with their suggestion, 
but I think agriculture has another for its significance to a state’s capacity. The fact that 
agriculture is a resource must be stressed; agriculture is, especially in India’s case, a 
necessary resource for employment, financial profit, and livelihood. Since agriculture is 
mass produced, I am reminded of the problems that may come with an abundance of 
resources. As I mentioned in the literature review, the availability of mass resources may 
lead to groups gaining greed and seeking to take control of these resources for their own 
profit. Also, political elites may desire to control these resources for their own benefits as 
well (McNeish 2010). As a result of the inefficient and wasteful use of agriculture, 
common citizens could develop grievances. I think a low agricultural yield would mean a 
resource limit for commoners but not for political elites and possibly those affected by 
greed. Political elites would seem to possess more capabilities than commoners, so 
political elites could use their power to ensure they retain capital. Political elites 
forcefully using their power to maintain profits would fall into the category of state based 
violence. Deaths from terrorism could be a result of rebellious groups, either through 
greed or grievance, attempting to prevent political elites from controlling agricultural 
resources.  
However, my findings for a dependent variables differed from Wischnath’s and 
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 Buhaug’s. Wischnath and Buhaug found that the less there is food growth, more battle 
deaths would take place whereas my results failed to conclude whether food growth 
results in more or less battle deaths due to the high standard of error. As my findings 
failed to establish a positive or negative correlation between food growth and battle 
deaths, the results opened up the suggestion that possibly greater food growth could lead 
to increase number of deaths. DeRouen and Sobek support the logic of this scenario as 
they state, “ if there is such a base that the rebels can exploit for food, shelter and recruits, 
the insurgent army will be able to grow and prosper” (2014, 2). Yet, I feel that both my 
suggestion and Wischnath’s and Buhaug’s results may actually both be right. Perhaps 
food growth could be a non-directional variable depending on the instance. In a situation 
where there is a lack of food for members of a state, individuals may become desperate 
and rowdy and fight for a resource such as agriculture. Individuals may rebel due to the 
state being unable to ensure the distribution of food, an essential resource. Another 
suggestion would be that if these weakened people actually participate in conflict, they 
may be more likely to experience fatalities due to the lack of possible food consumption 
and their weakened medical state. Therefore, it is possible that the correlation between 
food growth and conflict depends on who is receiving or lacking food.  
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 Historical Case Study:  
As mentioned by Wischnath and Buhaug, India provided a really fascinating 
opportunity for a case study. The question I was looking to determine was whether state 
capacity determines conflict. I became convinced that India would make a good subject 
in finding an answer to this question, and I was persuaded through several reasons. First, 
India is a heavily sizable state. The state has sovereignty over 3,287,263 square 
kilometers, or 1,269,219.34 square miles, of land and water. Additionally, India is 
bordered by two seas, the Arabian Sea and Laccadive Sea, as well as the Bay of Bengal. 
Also, six states border India: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
Meanwhile, the territory within India is incredibly diverse. The territory provides various 
natural resources such as “coal, iron ore, manganese, mica, bauxite, rare earth elements, 
titanium ore, chromite, natural gas, diamonds, petroleum, limestone, [and] arable land.” 
The state is not immune to experiencing “droughts, flash floods, widespread and 
destructive flooding from monsoonal rains, severe thunderstorms, earthquakes,” and even 
volcanic eruptions. Like many other states, India faces environmental issues such as 
“deforestation, soil erosion, air pollution from industrial effluents and vehicle emissions, 
[and] water pollution.” The state incorporates 16 official languages: “Hindi, English, 
Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Malayalam, Kannada, Oriya, Punjabi, 
Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, and Sanskrit.” However, these are just official languages 
used by India’s government; unofficially, many more are spoken among residents. The 
state has a population of 1,266,883,598 people, and many of these people identify with 
being a Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or Sikh (Central Intelligence Agency 2016 B). These 
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 facts about India demonstrate that India is a diverse state, but India also contains 
similarities to other states whether it be through geography, water access, language, and 
religion. The diverseness within the state and similarities to other states is extremely 
important for a credible analysis. The fact that this is a case study must be stressed; not 
every state in the world is being analyzed to determine whether state capacity determines 
conflict. In this thesis, India is simply a sample state used to help understand an overall 
general concept. Therefore, India provides an interesting sample to analyze as this one 
sample contains significant diverseness to possibly represent a broader picture.  
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 Conclusion:  
State capacity has a noticeable correlation towards the emergence of conflict. I 
suggest that state capacity is affected by sub-national differences. The differences I look 
at is terrain which I find is very significant. Numerous types of terrain may compose of a 
state; these types include plainlands, flatlands, forests, beaches, hills, swamps, deserts, 
and mountains. The type of terrain can affect the capacity of a state and some critical 
issues states may face such as conflict with rebellious and terroristic groups. Plus, terrain 
also affects population density; the higher the altitude, the lower amounts of people reside 
in that area. Since states, such as India, claim and attempt uphold sovereignty over these 
rough areas, they need to display sufficient capacity in these areas, not just in the higher 
populated and easier to control flatter regions. To be clear again, state capacity is the 
measurement of how well a state can ensure stability within its territory through 
militarized and political means. High capacity states are considered as states that are able 
to supply significant public goods such as effective domestic and interstate security, 
health services, and freedom in the development of physical and social infrastructure. 
Low capacity states are seen as states which struggle to and are ineffective in providing 
these major and essential public goods. The consequences of the lack of state capacity 
include “low social trust, low development levels, regime, or even state failure” (Ottervik 
2013, 3). Governments, especially democracies, are highly vulnerable to collapse if high 
state capacity is not maintained.  
As noticeable from the characterization of high capacity, security and physical 
infrastructure are two key components. Through my experiment, I tested whether 
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 topography and lack of roads could have effects on conflict. My findings suggested that a 
correlation exists between increased topography and increased terroristic deaths. 
However, the standard of error was too high to determine if there is a positive or negative 
correlation between topography and state based violence and between topography and 
battle deaths. For road coverage, my findings found that the less road overage of an area, 
the more state based violence, battle deaths, and deaths from terrorism will take place. 
These three independent variables are significant because they all deal with either 
violence or deaths which are constitutes of conflict. The dependent variables of 
topography and roads are significant because they seem to test state capacity. 
Topography is a type of terrain; it cannot be cleared away even if problematic to a state’s 
stability. Road coverage can possibly be improved, but this improvement can be difficult 
in rough surfaces and not economically viable, especially in terrain where there is lack of 
potential for development and where fewer people live. Therefore, these dependent 
variables might require states to pool in more resources to maintain a necessary capacity. 
If  a state unable to provide necessary security presence in their claimed territory, the 
state by definition would be a low capacity state. 
The weaknesses in my findings and discussions is that they are partly based on 
speculation and personal reason. For my recordings of roads and topography, I did not 
have access to resources which provided an undoubtable percentage of topography within 
each Indian state, territory, and observed city. Rather, I had to estimate and calculate my 
own percentages. I tried to base my measurements through a method I thought would 
lead to more accuracy, but at the end of my method, I was still estimating, even if the 
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 estimates became simpler. If this method is repeated by another person, he or she still has 
the potential to determine and record different percentages from me. Another flaw is with 
other dependent variable of major road coverage. I think measuring road quality would 
make a much more valid variable. The maps which I used for roads only displayed 
official highways and major roads; there is no data on other types of roads that may be 
used but not provided by the state such as dirt or rocky roads. Being able to access data 
on the quality of the roads with each Indian state, territory, and observed city would help 
form an idea of how well the state capacity is in its provision of infrastructure and 
distribution of goods. Thus if I had more resources, I would have been able to strengthen 
my empirical testing and possibly with different numerical data, not have encountered 
high standards of error for two of my topographic correlations. 
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 Historical Qualitative Analysis Between Indian Sikhs and Rule Under Different 
State Capacities:  
To further analyze the correlation between state capacity and conflict, I examine 
the ethnic group of Sikhs from a historical point of view. I seek to prove how the dissent 
of Sikhs because of their treatment is conditioned by state capacity. I hypothesize ethnic 
conflict is determined by state capacity based on whether the capacity is low or high. For 
comprehensive purposes, I shall provide a very brief history of Sikhs. 
Sikhs are an ethnic and religious group who believe in “the unity of God and the 
brotherhood of man, without distinction of race, class, or creed” (Gough & Innes 1897, 
18). From the beginning of Sikhism in the late 1400s, women have been valued by Sikhs 
as the second most important creators of life after God and have been seen as deserving 
equal societal treatment as men. The founder of the main philosophy of Sikhism is known 
as Guru Nanak, but over time, Sikhism had been led by 10 living gurus in which each 
guru received the title of guru in succession to the life of previous guru. The spread and 
wide acceptance of Sikhism conflicted with the interests of the Mughal Empire, a 
Northern Indian Islamic kingdom which sought to influence the acceptance of Islam in its 
territory even if acceptance resorted to threats and violent force. Other than violations of 
civil freedoms, Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims faced economic and political inequality as 
wealthy elites and nobles dictated the management and prosperity distribution of society. 
The higher classes controlled luxurious amounts of wealth while poverty was rampant in 
the lower classes with minimum available economic opportunities and a discriminatory 
caste oriented social structure. Adding to the mass resentment of the Mughal Empire was 
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 the imprisonment and execution of Sikh gurus; the gurus are considered tremendously 
holy to Sikhs, and the majority of gurus died through the use of repression and violence 
orchestrated by Mughal Empire leaders. The tenth and last living guru is known as Guru 
Gobind; upset over Islamic leaders unfairly treating citizens and the deaths of previous 
gurus, Guru Gobind led a partly successful rebellion against Mughal rule in which 
scattered areas of territory became free from the control of the Mughal Empire. He 
formally established the Khalsa, a set of rules and guidelines which distinguished Sikhs 
spiritually and physically from other religions and ethnic groups. On his deathbed in 
October 1708 following wounds received from an assassination attempt, Guru Gobind 
declared that no more living gurus should succeed after his death. Guru Gobind made 
clear that all Sikhs should follow the teachings of the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book 
of Sikhs which consists of a collection of hand written teachings from the previous gurus 
(Purewal 2000). 
Following the death of Guru Goband, a Sikh state was created out of territories 
which had been previously under the rule of the Mughal Empire. Banda Bahadur 
temporary ruled the state until the Mughal Empire issued a genocide against Sikhs; he 
and his four year old son were eventually captured and executed. After Bahadur's death, 
the Sikh state scattered as different factions were run by separate leaders, and the Sikh 
states allied with feudal landlords for the purposes of defense. A legendary Sikh leader 
referred to as Maharaja, meaning great king, Ranjit Singh emerged from one of these 
factions and united all the remaining Sikh factions under a single political and military 
banner (Purewal 2000). Under the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Sikh Empire 
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 reached the height of its power. This northern Indian kingdom stretched into multiple 
provinces: from Malwa and Kashmir to the Afghan border (Gough & Innes 1897). The 
unity and economic and military power of the Sikh Empire kept the state safe from 
outside threats, especially the United Kingdom which was heavily expanding into and 
colonizing much of India. Unlike the Mughal Empire which previously ruled this 
territory, the Sikh Empire incorporated people from all religions and backgrounds in its 
political and military ranks. However, the golden age of Sikhs came to an end with the 
death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839. Chaos over who to succeed him divided the 
kingdom, and the United Kingdom struck during this time which led to the defeat and 
conquest of the Sikh Empire in 1849. The Sikhs attempted multiple rebellions to 
overthrow the British, but the might of the United Kingdom was far greater. After Indian 
and Pakistani independence in the August of 1947, the former territory of the Sikh 
Empire was broken between the Hindu state of India and the Muslim state of Pakistan. 
Sikhs were embedded under India rather than receiving their own homeland. Today, 
Sikhs are spread throughout India and the world but are mainly concentrated in the Indian 
province of Punjab. Despite the increasing influx of Hindus into Punjab and the massive 
migration of Sikhs out of Punjab, Sikhs currently consist of around two-thirds of Punjab's 
population alone. Many Sikhs in and outside India feel grievances towards the Indian 
government based on issues with human rights, corruption, and the diminishing of Sikh 
culture (Purewal 2000). Within the Sikh community, there is currently support and push 
to pursue an independent Punjab from Indian rule which would display a revival of the 
former Sikh Empire. The new name for an independent Punjab which supporters of this 
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 movement lounge for is Khalistan (Rajghatta 2013). 
An important occurrence in the history of Sikhs to stress is that the buildup of 
dissent towards the Mughal Empire led to rebellion. This occurrence provides an example 
of ethnic conflict being conditioned by state capacity as the reason factions of Sikh states 
successfully developed was due to the limited and disrupted state capacity of the Mughal 
Empire. Though simple, an important point to keep in mind is that strong motives may 
correlate to actions. As mentioned previously, Sikhs had a deep resentment of Mughal 
rule due to the Mughal's intense intolerance and persecution of faiths and beliefs that 
were not Islamic, murders of Sikh gurus, and discriminatory and unfair distribution of 
wealth and resources. Intense Sikh dissent towards the rule Mughal Empire did not occur 
at the beginning of Sikh ideology and formulation, but rather over time after the buildup 
of constant abuses (Purewal 2000). Yet simply dissent itself does not result a radical 
change such as the enactment of a different regime. A substantial objection by a group, in 
this case Sikhs, to perceived unjust procedures definitely fuels the desires and motives for 
violent resistance, but as described in the literature review, desires do not necessarily 
result in action (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). A current example of this is the relationship 
between the United States and North Korea. North Korea's perception of the United 
States is extremely hostile, and North Korea has made constant official broadcasts over 
its desire to attack the United States and unify itself with South Korea by force (US 
Department of Defense 2016). However, the last major conflict between North Korea and 
the United States was during the Korean War. The reason for the lack of war between the 
two states is that the United States has far more economic and militaristic capabilities 
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 than North Korea (Taylor 2015). In other words, there is a major state capacity difference 
between the United States and North Korea. North Korea is a low capacity state which 
struggles to provide its citizens with basic necessities such as food and governmental 
efficiency whereas the United States is the world's hegemony with the strongest 
economic and military might (Lim 2012) (Bremmer 2015). Thus, a conflict between the 
two states would be obviously one-sided, and North Korea responds to this understanding 
by not acting on its desires. Though this example is not focused on ethnicity, the example 
demonstrates how even a strong desire among a group can be repressed by another group 
with a greater capacity. 
In the case between the Sikhs and the Mughal Empire, the Mughal Empire had a 
diminished state capacity as the altercation between the Sikhs and the Mughals coincided 
with a breakdown of the power and influence within the Mughal Empire. The fall of the 
Mughal Empire is credited under the rule of their monarch, Aurangzib, from 1658-1707. 
A thorough explanation of the fall of the Mughal Empire could encompass a lengthy 
essay or even a book, but bluntly, the Mughal Empire experienced multiple failures 
which included an inefficient governmental structure which favored nobles and did not 
properly spread wealth to lower classes, unfitness to maintain control of their southern 
empire, dependence on the use of bribery as a means for control, inability to defeat 
southern rebellious factions such as the Marathas which inspired even more rebellions, 
losses of critical economic centers to rebels, and breakdown of economic might. The 
reason for these failures includes the fact that the Mughal Empire was extremely 
expansive, and at a point, covered almost all of India. During the Mughal Empire's reign 
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 in India, the empire maintained control over numerous ethnic groups. As shown by the 
rebellions, not all groups, such as the Marathas and Sikhs, under the control of the 
Mughal Empire identified themselves with the Mughals. However, the Mughal Empire 
reigned for over 300 years which means the state had been a high capacity state, or a state 
capable of defending its outside borders and maintaining control of its claimed territory 
(Pearson 1976). With the gradual build up of dissent, poor management, and military 
losses, the Mughal Empire become a low capacity state. Since the Mughal Empire 
struggled with distributing wealth, apart within its nobles, much of its citizens did not 
possess an adequate income. The inability for the Mughal state to enforce sovereignty 
was critical to the breakdown of their empire. In fact, Pearson describes that the Mughals 
were struggling to put an end to the Maratha rebellion as they were “distracted by other 
revolts” (Pearson 1976, 235). The loss of control surely only encouraged repressed ethnic 
groups, such as Sikhs, to rebel as it demonstrated an opportunity to expose a weak point 
in the Mughal Empire; the loss of control was a signal that the Mughals did not have as 
much capacity to maintain their territory as previously in their domain. 
Yet, even low capacity states are still technically states. Just because a state 
struggles with the provision of its citizens of necessary standards and fails to maintain 
complete control of its inner and outer borders does not mean that the state has not some 
form of government, however weak, and some form of military. Even after the procession 
of a state turning from a high capacity state to a weak capacity state, the state still 
possesses power that is diminished but not depleted. For example, modern day Pakistan is 
a low capacity state that was high capacity, considering its past of being dominated by the 
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 rule of the United Kingdom. Currently, Pakistan struggles with maintaining similar 
control as the United Kingdom had considering the state is plagued with radical factions, 
terrorism, and other forms of unruly behavior. However, an official Pakistani government 
is still in place. Any terrorist or rebellious factions are still met with some resistance by 
the official Pakistani regime (Masood 2012). A similar scenario was between ethnic Sikh 
groups and the Mughal Empire. As mentioned previously, the Mughal Empire suffered 
from structural and military failures which diminished its state capacity and control of its 
territory to rebellious ethnic groups. However, the Mughal Empire was not completely 
depleted and maintained governmental and militaristic presence. Therefore, in the 
altercation with the Sikhs, the problem for the Mughal Empire was not simply that the 
power of their empire was shrinking, but that by this time, their state capacity had already 
lowered far enough from a point where they had retained territorial domination of much 
of India, to the point where their weak state capacity signaled a lack of power with their 
structure and opportunity for the Sikhs to permanently resolve their grievances against 
the Mughal Empire (Pearson 1976). 
The ethnic interactions between the Sikhs and the British empire displays a 
different side of the coin. As stated before, the United Kingdom conquered the Sikh 
Empire in 1849 during a time of chaos after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Unlike 
the Mughal Empire, the United Kingdom had a much stronger state capacity. Their state 
was highly capable of not just conquering additional territory but maintaining it as well. 
The United Kingdom fought two wars, known as the Anglo-Sikh Wars, to conquer the 
Sikhs. Despite the conflict between the Sikhs and British empire, many Sikhs eventually 
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 became loyal military assets to the British Empire. In fact, “by the First World War, 
Sikhs constituted a third of the [Indian British] armed forces” despite being just 2% of 
India's population (Tatla 1999) (Singh 2010). Many Sikhs were deployed to fight for the 
British in World War I and World War II. Sikhs loyal to the British were also 
instrumental in preserving the British dominated status quo within India by acting as a 
counter force for any possible uprisings (Tatla 1999). Compared to the Mughal Empire, 
the United Kingdom was more wary about a possible threat Sikhs could have over their 
reign. In order to appease the Sikhs, the British Empire allowed Sikhs to maintain control 
over Sikh houses of worship, permitted Sikhs serving in the British army to wear 
religious attire, allowed all Sikhs to wear religious daggers which was an exception to 
weapon prohibition acts, built canals and roads to benefit the farms and commerce of 
Sikhs, and employed Sikhs in local administrative positions (Singh 2010). The 
appeasement towards Sikhs demonstrates proof of a noticeable difference of state 
capacity between the Mughal Empire and the United Kingdom as the appeasement was a 
political tactic to prevent Sikh rebellion. As mentioned before, the Mughal Empire was 
heavily Islamic, and Sikh ideology was seen as a threat to Mughal rule (Purewal 2000). 
In other words, the Mughal Empire did not have the political capability to control the 
Sikhs, so the Mughal Empire had to resort to unsuccessful force while the United 
Kingdom's permitting of Sikh ideology and limited control was an alternative to force. 
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